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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In a well-written editorial in the British Medical Journal,2 Kelley and Tucci 
provide insight into the deficiencies of the Institute of Medicine’s book, Crossing the 
Quality Chasm: A New Heath Care System for the 21st Century.3  The authors 
observed that Crossing the Quality Chasm has, “received only a subdued response,” 
especially when compared with the public outcry after the Institute of Medicine’s 
prior publication To Err is Human: Building a Safer Health Care System, that 
reported that up to 98,000 Americans die each year from errors in our health care 
system.4  Kelly and Tucci offer two interrelated reasons for the divergent public 
responses between these two Institute of Medicine publications:  (1) the ambitious 
goals of the Institute of Medicine outlined in Crossing the Quality Chasm are 
supported only by a general outline for an action plan, and (2) the underlying 
complex adaptive system theory is only in a nascent stage of development.5  Thus, 
                                                                
1Thomas R. McLean, MD, JD, FACS, tmclean@dnamail.com.  Clinical Assistant 
Professor of Surgery, Kansas University School of Medicine; Attending Surgeon at the 
Dwight D. Eisenhower Veterans Administration Medical Center, Leavenworth, Kansas; 
Medical Director, Third Millennium Consultants, LLC, Shawnee, Kansas, 
http://www.firms.findlaw.com/TMCLLC. 
2Mark A. Kelley & James M. Tucci, Bridging the Quality Chasm: To Improve Health 
Care We Need to Understand the Motivations of Those Who Work In It, 323 BRIT. MED. J. 61 
(2001).  
3COMMITTEE ON QUALITY HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, CROSSING 
THE QUALITY CHASM:  A NEW HEALTH CARE SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY, available at 
http://www.nap.edu/catalog/10027.html [hereinafter “CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM”]. 
4COMMITTEE ON QUALITY HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, TO ERR IS 
HUMAN:  BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH CARE SYSTEM (Linda T. Kohn, et al. eds., 2000). 
5Kelley, supra note 2, at 62. 
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Kelly and Tucci are suggesting that the generalities associated with an esoteric 
economic theory do not capture the public’s imagination like an excessive body 
count.6  This is, without a doubt, true.  Accordingly, the authors recommend that we 
need to, “explore the motivations and incentives of those who provide care”7 before 
complex adaptive system theory is allowed to become an integral part of patient care.  
Unfortunately, while Kelley and Tucci’s conclusion is logically sound, it is likely to 
go unheard by governmental health care reformers because it ignores the “Real 
Politik” of our health care delivery system.   
“Real Politik,” a term in vogue at the height of the Cold War, contemplates that 
in practice, governmental bodies attempt to expand their spheres of influence and 
control by the application of economic leverage.8  The federal government is clearly 
interested in expanding its influence into health care because of its cost.9  Americans 
spend over one trillion dollars — forty-four percent of which is paid for by the 
federal government — on health care each year.10  To control the cost of health care, 
governmental reformers proposed the Health Securities Act of 199311 as a frontal 
assault on the American health care system.  But, to the reformers’ chagrin, the 
Health Securities Act was dead on arrival, as much from the message as the 
messenger.12  Undeterred by having the front door of reform barred by a plurality of 
interests, the reformers shifted gears to use a side entrance to legislative reform — 
administrative agency law.  Presently, health care reformers are using administrative 
law to institute many of the core concepts of the Health Securities Act.   
Thus, to understand the cool media response to the release of Crossing the 
Quality Chasm, which provides only a general blueprint for health care reform, the 
Real Politik of administrative agency law must be grasped; moreover, once the 
machination of agency law is grasped, it is possible to reasonably predict where 
health care reform is heading.  
Accordingly, Part II of this Article provides an overview of federal 
administrative agency procedure; Part III sets forth the argument that if Institute of 
Medicine had desired a media event associated with the release of the Crossing the 
Quality Chasm it would have been arranged; Part IV argues that the absence of 
orchestrated media response was intended to facilitate the health care reform though 
promulgation of agency regulations.  Part V examines the potential for the National 
Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 199513 to facilitate the rule making of 
federal agencies concerned with health care.  This Article concludes that Crossing 
                                                                
6Id. 
7Id. 
8WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN LANGUAGE (2d ed. 1974).  
9Thomas R. McLean, Implication of Patient Safety Research and Risk Managed Care, 26 
S. ILL. L.J. 227 (2002). 
10Shelia Smith et al., The Next Decade of Health Spending: A New Outlook, 18 HEALTH 
AFF. 86 (1999).  
11H.R. 1200, 103d Cong. (1993). 
12William M. Sage, Enterprise Liability And The Emerging Managed Health Care System, 
60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 159 (1997).  
1315 U.S.C. § 3701 (2001).  
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the Quality Chasm is only the first of many public announcements of coming health 
care reform regulations.  Thus, the “Real Politik” of Crossing the Quality Chasm is 
that all interested parties immediately need to provide comment in health care 
publications, before the publications form the foundation of a new federal regulation.  
II.  PRACTICAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
Administrative agencies exist to transform general governmental policy into 
operational reality.14  Congress has broad discretion to delegate its powers, including 
rulemaking, to administrative agencies.15  Unless the delegation is associated with an 
unintelligible standard, courts will not second-guess congressional delegation of 
power.  From a practical point of view, a standard such as, “to make regulations that 
are in the public’s interest,” is sufficient to be intelligible to the courts.16  Once the 
agency receives the delegation “green light,” it is free to begin the research that will 
lead to a proposed regulation.  In short, Congress delegates with broad-brush strokes 
leaving the details to be filled in later as the agency acquire expertise.17  
Agencies are not unfettered.  The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) requires 
that the administrative agency subject a proposed rule to, “notice, comment, and 
hearing,” as the procedure for proper promulgation.18  It is through proper 
promulgation that a proposed rule becomes a federal regulation.  In general, this 
means that the agency must publish the proposed regulation in the Federal Register, 
provide interested parties with sufficient opportunity to comment, and then consider 
whether the rule needs to be revised in light of the comments received.19  The 
purpose of the public’s involvement is to allow interested parties the opportunity to 
object on the record to the substance of the proposed rule.20  In addition, the agency 
must disclose any technical basis for the proposed regulation.21  Because of the time 
and effort an agency must invest to promulgate a regulation under the APA, the 
agency acquires true expertise in the subject matter.   
During subsequent review of an agency’s promulgation, such expertise is a 
benefit to the agency because the judicial system will defer to the expertise of 
agency, as it would any expert.22  Unfortunately, promulgation of regulation also has 
a downside.  Because promulgation of a regulation requires substantial sums of 
                                                                
14JOHN H. REESE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 7 (1995).  
15Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989). 
16Nat’l Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943). 
17New York Coalition of Recycling Enters. v. City of New York, 598 N.Y.S. 649, 658 
(1990). 
18See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2001).  
19Christopher J. Nowicki, A Step Back From Chevron?  An Analysis of Kelley v. EPA, 9 
ADMIN. L. J. AM. U. 221, 230-31 (1995). 
20Marathon Oil Co. v. EPA, 564 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1977).  
21Conn. Light & Power Co. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 673 F.2d 525 (D.C. Cir. 
1982).  
22Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Def. Council, Inc. 435 U.S. 519 
(1978).  
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money, an administrative agency also acquires a vested interest in having that 
regulation become law to justify its existence.  
Because a properly promulgated regulation has the force of a law, in essence the 
administrative agencies are a non-elected “fourth branch” to our government.23  To 
illustrate the power of an agency to make law through the promulgation of 
regulations, consider the evolution of the recent final Privacy Rule regulations for 
electronic medical records from its Congressional inception of its final form.24   
Congress passed the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 
(HIPAA)25 to provide in part for the regulation of electronic medical record.  The Act 
authorized the Secretary of Health Human Services (HHS) to develop regulations in 
the event that Congress did not act within two years to develop specific legislation 
for electronic medical records.26  But following the time honored principle of 
general, rather than specific delegation, all that the Secretary of HHS was charged 
with was adopting “standards for transactions, and data elements for such transactions, 
to enable health information to be exchanged electronically.”27  It was a pretty sure bet 
in August 1996, when HIPPA was passed, that Congress would not provide 
supplemental detail.  First, because HHS already possessed expertise in health care 
delivery.  Second, and just as important is the fact that providing political detail can 
create political liability.28  Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that after the 
HIPPA’s effective date of July 1, 1997, HHS dutifully, if only informally, began its 
research and drafting of the Privacy Rule.  
The Department’s research must have included a review of a general outline for 
the management of electronic medical records published by the Institute of Medicine 
earlier in the decade.  Many of the general principles on electronic medical records 
that were announced in The Computer-Based Patient Record: An Essential 
Technology for Health Care29 were subsequently incorporated into the final Privacy 
Rule.  That is, to gain the necessary expertise to provide the detailed regulations on 
electronic medical records, HHS turned to, and naturally adapted, the 
recommendation of another quasi-governmental agency.  For two years after the 
effective date of HIPPA, HHS worked laboriously drafting the 900-page set of 
                                                                
23FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 478 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting).  
24Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 66 Fed. Reg. 
12738-02 (Feb. 28, 2001).  
25Pub. L. No. 104-91, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996).  
26Id. at 1980. 
27Id. at 1173. 
28HIPPA when passed was it popularly known as the “Kennedy-Kassabaum Act” because 
it increased the portability of health care insurance — a political asset, but as the detailed 
onerous regulations were published, the eponymous recognition of the Act’s sponsors has 
faded. 
29See generally COMMITTEE ON IMPROVING THE PATIENT RECORD, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, 
THE COMPUTER BASED PATIENT RECORD:  AN ESSENTIAL TECHNOLOGY FOR HEALTH CARE 
(Richard S. Dick & Elaine B. Steen eds., 1997), available at http://www.nap.edu/catalog/ 
1813.html. 
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regulations controlling the transmission of electronic medical records.30  Ultimately, 
because of an extension provided by the new HHS Secretary, Tommy Thompson, 
HHS received over 63,000 comments on the proposed Privacy Rule.31  Despite this 
massive public input, relatively little substantive change was made in the 
comprehensive Privacy Rule.  Having committed two years of time adapting public 
information from other agencies, HHS had become (rightfully) confident of its 
expertise of electronic medical records.  Thus, HHS was able to dismiss many 
comments to the proposed Privacy rule with statements like “[w]e have decided, for 
a number of reasons, to retain the approach as presented in the proposed rule.”32 
This approach to minimizing the comments is well within the prerogative of an 
agency.  Agencies know that their opinion carries weight because of their expertise.  
All experts are by nature, resistant to revising a formed opinion unless they are 
confronted with substantial evidence to the contrary.  Agencies are no different.  If 
the agency is challenged in court because it summarily dismissed comments, the 
interested party will have a difficult time prevailing against the agency because, as 
an expert, deference is given to the agency.33  This means that to prevail against the 
agency judgment on what is properly included in a regulation, the interested party 
must show more than the agency’s interpretation of Congressional delegation as an 
arbitrary choice of one of several possible choices.34  To prevail after the agency 
provides a rational basis for regulation, the opponent must provide substantial 
evidence that the regulation is misguided.35  Thus, once proposed, as a regulation 
reaches the comment stage of promulgation, the judiciary is limited in the extent that 
it can compel the expert agency to revise a well-rationalized regulation.36   
III.  THE LOW PROFILE RELEASE OF CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM WAS INTENTIONAL  
Like-minded health care reformers orchestrated the media feeding frenzy 
associated with the release of To Err is Human.37  Although the Institute of Medicine 
has long been concerned with patient safety, for most of its history, it has operated 
out of the limelight.  But, in the wake of Congress’ failure to pass the Health 
Security Act, concern for patient safety began to rise as horror stories of the excesses 
of managed care medicine increased.38  In response to concerns that managed care 
organizations were harming patients by either the outright denial of medical 
                                                                
30Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 64 Fed. Reg. 
59918-01 (Nov. 3, 1999).  
31Lovern, Privacy In Spotlight’s Glare, Kennedy to Fight Proposal to Ease Disclosure 
Rules, MOD. HEALTH CARE, Mar. 25, 2002, at 6. 
3265 Fed. Reg. 82462, 82601 (45 CFR 160, 164) Dec. 28, 2000. 
33FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000). 
34Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483 (1978).   
35Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Bear Freight Sys., Inc. 419 U.S. 281 (1974). 
36However, sufficient bad press during the comment period may result in increased 
Congressional oversight.  
37McLean, supra note 9.  
38Id. 
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treatment, or alternatively by inducing physicians to provide suboptimal care, several 
organizations both within the government (e.g. Agency for Healthcare Research and 
Quality (AHRQ), and outside of the government (e.g. National Patient Safety 
Foundation and the National Quality Foundation), have appeared with a mission to 
improve patient safety.  Additionally, several other governmental agencies, like the 
Veterans Administration and Health Care Finance Administration, are in the process 
of “re-inventing” themselves so that patient safety receives much greater emphasis.  
All of these organizations banded together with the Institute of Medicine to focus 
media attention on patient safety.  
The evidence that these organizations are coordinating their efforts is 
circumstantial.39  Institute of Medicine members serve in leadership positions in 
fledging patient safety organizations.40  Such membership is not coincidental.  
Although the Institute of Medicine’s policy is to release it reports directly to the 
public, the new patient safety organizations were able to digest the Institute of 
Medicine’s To Err is Human and adopt the figures and conclusions within days.  
Within a week of the release of To Err is Human, former President Bill Clinton 
adopted the report’s recommendation to make the AHRQ the central agency for 
patient safety oversight.41  As a result of the media blitzkrieg, it seemed at the time 
that one could hardly go more than a day without reading a newspaper article or 
hearing a television station advertisement for a media tabloid news story about 
patient safety.  
The media response to the release of To Err is Human leaves little doubt the 
Institute of Medicine, and other interested governmental organizations, could have 
orchestrated a media frenzy associated with the release of Crossing the Quality 
Chasm.  But, Kelly and Tucci are correct.  The media has been strangely silent on the 
release of Crossing the Quality Chasm.42  Certainly, there are newsworthy stories 
contained in this report.  For example, the flyleaf contains the mission statement that 
the “Institute of Medicine, shaping the future of health” is followed by the first 
sentence that asserts the “American health care delivery system is in need of 
fundamental change.”43  When one considers that Crossing the Quality Chasm was 
published a little over a year after President Clinton assured America that it had the 
best health care system in the world,44 such radical change in our health care system 
should have been worth an editorial comment.  Moreover, Crossing the Quality 
Chasm took notice that the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey found that fifteen 
medical conditions account for the majority of medical costs.45  In the context of 
                                                                
39Id.  
40McLean, supra note 9. 
41Id. 
42See Kelley, supra note 2. 
43See CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM, supra note 3. 
44President Bill Clinton, Remarks on Health Care (Dec. 7, 1999), available at 1999 WL 
1115218. 
45See CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM, supra note 3. 
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Crossing the Quality Chasm, the inescapable conclusion is that these conditions will 
be the first to be subjected to new regulatory guidelines promulgated by the AHRQ.46  
Given that the Institute of Medicine and other interested parties could have 
placed the newsworthy Crossing the Quality Chasm in the limelight, the absence of 
media attention points to an inescapable conclusion:  media scrutiny of Crossing the 
Quality Chasm was unwanted.  When the Health Security Act died a very public 
premature death,47 patient care advocates and those in Congress concerned with 
controlling medical cost inflation learned a valuable lesson:  reforming the health 
care system in this country would not be possible by a frontal assault characterized 
by the passage of a revolutionary piece of legislation.  Rather, to reform the health 
care system, a more circumspect approach using administrative law would have to be 
used.  But to use administrative law to reform our health care delivery system would 
require not only that Congress delegate to an administrative agency the charge of 
regulation of health care quality, but also that the designated agency be granted “lead 
time” (out of the limelight) to become an “expert.”  This latter activity — acquiring 
expertise — occurs most efficiently out of the limelight.  
IV.  USING ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TO ADVANCE HEALTH CARE REFORM 
The Healthcare Research and Quality Act of 1999 created the AHRQ.48  
Congress delegated to AHRQ the mission of enhancing “the quality, appropriateness, 
and effectiveness of health services through the establishment of a broad base of 
scientific research.”49  However, as used here, the word “research” clearly 
contemplates cost-effective measures.50  Certainly, the direction that Congress 
provided to AHRQ to promulgate health care quality guidelines is no more specific 
than the Congressional direction provided to HHS for the promulgation of 
regulations for electronic medical records.  President Clinton’s direction was only 
minimally more specific in that the President charged the AHRQ with monitoring 
provider quality and stimulating the development of evidence-based medicine.51  To 
facilitate the Agency’s mission, the AHRQ will receive $25 million for safety 
research and another $40 million to train individuals to become medical safety 
experts.52  In short, Congress has delegated authority and the funds needed for the 
AHRQ to develop safety-driven CQI clinical guideline regulations; all that is needed 
is some lead time for the AHRQ to gain expertise.  
Using the HIPPA timeline model as a general model for an administrative agency 
time line, one would predict that if the AHRQ is given two to five years of lead time 
to become an expert in health care delivery, AHRQ will be prepared to publish in the 
Federal Register a proposed set of regulations to control the “quality” of health care.  
                                                                
46Thomas R. McLean, The Institute of Medicine and the Risk Managed Care Revolution, 
96 GREATER KANSAS CITY METRO. MED. SOC’Y BULL. 16 (2001). 
47Sage, supra note 12.  
4842 U.S.C. § 299(A) (2000). 
49Id. 
50Id.  
51See President Clinton, supra note 44. 
52Id.  
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Thus, perhaps as early as next year, interested parties in health care quality should be 
prepared to provide comment on the purposed regulations.  In the meantime, just as 
the HHS looked to the Institute of Medicine and other agencies for the knowledge 
necessary to become the expert in electronic medical records, one would conclude 
that the AHRQ has and will look to the Institute of Medicine and other agencies to 
acquire expertise in health care quality.  The late administrator for the AHRQ, John 
Eisenberg was a member of the Institute of Medicine.  Moreover, one would predict 
that just as HHS filled in the details omitted from the Institute of Medicine’s The 
Computer-Based Patient Record: An Essential Technology for Health Care53 to 
produce the comprehensive privacy rule, the AHRQ will fill-in omitted details from 
the Institute of Medicine’s Crossing the Quality Chasm to produce comprehensive 
clinical guidelines to regulate the quality of health care.  Not surprising, this is 
precisely where the AHRQ is today. 
The “Real Politik” of AHRQ, or for that matter any agency, is that it moves from 
general to specific by launching “trial balloons.”54  If a general notice to the public 
does not provoke a negative response from interested parties, the agency hones the 
detail to an even finer level.  Alternatively, if a negative response is encountered, the 
agency can quietly retreat and shift gears.  Thus, as the AHRQ combs the data for 
what constitutes quality health care, the AHRQ has no desire to be micro-managed 
by public comment (which could trigger increased Congressional oversight).  Hence, 
the reason that neither the Institute of Medicine, nor any other health care reform 
organization wishes to organize a media frenzy is because it would interfere with the 
AHRQ’s feeling its way through politically sensitive issues.  Accordingly, all that 
Crossing the Quality Chasm was intended to do was to provide general notice that 
fifteen common conditions (and their associated surgery interventions) were targeted 
for regulation.55  
Since a spontaneous negative response did not follow the release of Crossing the 
Quality Chasm, the AHRQ has now moved to a more specific level.  In a recent 
publication by the AHRQ, the agency indicated that it has refined its target for 
regulation to the perioperative surgical management of the fifteen conditions cited in 
Crossing the Quality Chasm.56  Specifically, the AHRQ stated that “clear 
opportunities for research” exist for elucidating the evidence for the use of 
preoperative use of antibiotics, antibiotics, antithrombolitic therapy and informed 
consent.57  Once the AHRQ research has the evidence-based medical determination 
of what “works,” a proposed regulation will be published in the Federal Register.  It 
is to be expected that AHRQ will define the most cost-effective treatment for a 
particular situation as the standard of care.  For example, if AHRQ identifies a 
                                                                
53COMM. ON IMPROVING THE PATIENT CARE RECORD, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, NATIONAL 
ACADEMY OF SCIENCE (Richard S. Dick et al., eds. 1997). 
54BOB WOODWARD, MAESTRO:  ALAN GREENSPAN’S FED AND THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC 
BOOM (James Naughton, narrator) (Simon & Schuster Audio 2000). 
55CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM, supra note 3, at 10. 
56UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, MAKING HEALTH CARE SAFER: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF 
PATIENT SAFETY PRACTICES (Kaveh Shojania, M.D. et al. eds., 2000), at 
www.ahrq.gov/clinic/ptsafety/. 
57Id. 
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(cheap) first generation cephalosporin antibiotic to be the most cost-effective 
treatment of post-cholecystectomy pneumonia, it would be expected that the AHRQ 
would propose a regulation that that the standard of care for treating post-
cholecystectomy pneumonia is with a first generation cephalosporin antibiotic.  
Failure to use a cephalosporin antibiotic, or to use more than a cephalosporin 
antibiotic for post-cholecystectomy pneumonia, would be deemed substandard care.  
Substandard care of course would provide the government with a rational basis not to 
provide reimbursement for such services.58  
V.  REAL POLITIK AND THE NEAR FUTURE OF AGENCY LAW 
The AHRQ and other related agencies have come to realize that the National 
Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 199559 (NTTAA) can facilitate 
promulgation of the specifics of technical regulations keeping the agency out of the 
limelight.  Although intended for non-health care industries, NTTAA’s stated 
purpose is “to speed the development of new products and processes by entering into 
cooperative research and development agreements which make available the 
assistance of Federal laboratories to the private sector.”60  Accordingly, the NTTAA 
directs that if a federal agency intended to develop standards for an industry, the 
agency “where possible [will] use of standards developed by private, consensus 
organizations.”61  The NTTAA therefore creates a win-win situation for government 
and private industry.  The government benefits because it is able to transfer some of 
the costs associated with the promulgation of regulation of an industry to private 
enterprises,62 while the private enterprises benefit by having a hand in writing the 
regulations that govern their operations.  Thus, given that the NTTAA has been 
around for six years, it is not surprising that the government, as it moves from 
general to specific, is now quietly seeking to obtain pre-packaged specific standards 
from industry.63  And while it is true that a governmental agency will have to provide 
notice that it intends to adopt a voluntary consensus organization’s standards, it is 
not likely that agency will receive many negative comments.  
                                                                
58Thomas R. McLean, The Political Correct Language of Leadership by Example.  
(Manuscript on file with the author). 
5915 U.S.C. § 3701 (2001). 
60Id., § 3701(2)(2). 
61§ 3701(12). 
62Veeck v. Southern Bldg. Code Cong. Int’l, Inc., 241 F.3d 398, 406 (5th Cir. 2001) 
(citing 63 Fed. Reg. 8545, 8554-55 (Feb. 19, 1998)).  (“We believe that if code writing groups 
like SBCCI lose their incentives to craft and update model codes and thus cease to publish, the 
foreseeable outcome is that state and local governments would have to fill the void directly, 
resulting in increased governmental costs.”). 
63For example, consider the Department of Health and Human Service’s call for voluntary 
consensus organization to step forward to help it develop guidelines for the treatment of 
Hepatitis.  See Opportunity for Cooperative Research and Developmental Agreements 
(CRADAs) to Implement a Multicenter, Clinical Trial to Study Viral Resistance to Pegylated 
Interferon Therapy in Combination with Ribavirin in Patients Who Have Chronic Hepatitis C, 
Genotype 1, Specifically Focusing on African Americans, 66 Fed. Reg. 41252 (Aug. 7, 2001). 
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Against this backdrop enters the National Quality Foundation (NQF), which was 
formed in 1998, upon the recommendation of the President’s Advisory Commission 
on Consumer Protection and Quality in the Health Care Industry.64  The NQF is a 
non-profit organization whose membership is concerned with national health care 
quality improvement.65  Membership is voluntary, and includes ARHQ and many of 
the large corporate purchasers of health care products and services.  The NQF is thus 
precisely the type of private consensus organization stipulated by NTTAA.66  In the 
wake of the announcement that our health care delivery system is need of 
fundamental change,67 Dr. Ken Kizer, Chief Executive Officer of the NQF, envisions 
NTTAA as a powerful weapon for “shaping the future of health.”68  
Specifically Dr. Kizer envisions the NQF — which he asserts is in compliance 
with the NTTA requirements for a “voluntary consensus organization” — is a 
vehicle for developing clinical guideline standards that the government will be 
“virtually compelled” to adopt. 69  In practice, under the Kizer model for health care 
reform, the NQF, using a consensus model with public input,70 would develop and 
publish a clinical care standard; an example includes how many times a patient 
should receive percutaneous transluminal angioplasty [hereinafter “PTCA”] prior to 
being referred for surgical intervention.71  Accordingly, this would mean that later, 
when the AHRQ moves from general to specific in formulating regulations on 
cardiac care, if the AHRQ chooses to regulate the number of PTCA a patient 
receives in the name of quality, if it is at all possible, the AHRQ is directed by the 
NTTAA to adopt the NQF’s industrial driven consensus guidelines.   
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Kelley and Tucci’s thoughtful editorial leads to a logical conclusion that a better 
understanding of complex adaptive system theory is required before it is applied to 
the field of health care.72  Unfortunately, logic is not at issue with health care reform; 
the issue is the control of cost.   
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Having failed to pass the Health Securities Act, administrative agency law 
became the vehicle to implement health care reform.  Agencies do not require 
detailed instructions to implement reform regulations; rather, the agency process 
intrinsically produces detail as it heads off in the general direction pointed to by 
congressional delegation.  And while the Institute of Medicine and other interested 
parties could have arranged for Crossing the Quality Chasm to become a media 
frenzy, such attention would only put the AHRQ into the limelight, thereby 
providing a distraction to the AHRQ’s bureaucracy.  Operation of the AHRQ out of 
the limelight can only mean one thing: the AHRQ is compiling a comprehensive 
proposed rule that will be difficult to alter or amend even if 100,000 comments are 
received; or alternatively the AHRQ is planning to adopt a NQF standard that will 
receive minimal comment because parties concerned where involved in writing the 
NQF standard.  
The Real Politik of administrative agency law is that if an interested party wishes 
to challenge a proposed regulation, it is imprudent to wait until the agency publishes 
the regulations and begins to accept comments to initiate a challenge to the agency’s 
conclusions.  The better strategy is to challenge future regulation while the agency is 
doing its research.  That is, the communications that form the basis for future 
regulations must be scrutinized.  For health care attorneys, this means that they 
should advise their clients to scrutinize medical opinions and documents released by 
any administrative agency, and to file any objections or reservations with the editors 
of any appropriate medical or surgical journals.  Additionally, health care attorneys 
should be advising their clients to become members of the NQF and frequently 
monitor the NQF’s web page for an indication of the content future regulations.  
Upfront negative publicity to clinical publication and NQF’s activities is the best 
way to precipitate increase congressional oversight.73   
Conversely, failure to scrutinize and criticize communications in medical reports 
and from the NQF will serve as a motivational force to transform general delegation 
language into specific regulations.  Thus, unless the data in the Institute of 
Medicine’s most recent communication on the relationship between the volume of 
pancreatic and esophageal resections and outcome is challenged,74 one can 
reasonably expect that such a document could easily serve as a rational basis for the 
AHRQ to promulgate a regulation that restricts pancreatic and esophageal resection 
to a half-dozen “centers of excellence.”75  Having restricted pancreatic and 
esophageal surgery to centers of excellence, can a similar restriction be far behind 
for angioplasty and cardiac surgery? 
In short, the Real Politik of Crossing the Quality Chasm is that if administrative 
agency recommendations and public disclosures concerning medicine are not 
scrutinized by the medical journal, the stage will be set for these same agencies to 
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promulgate regulations that will inexorably and unequivocally limit and restrict the 
physician’s autonomy.  
